Ruth Simmons joined Goldman Sachs’s board as an outside director in January 2000; a year later she became president of Brown University. For the rest of the decade she apparently managed both roles without attracting much criticism. But by the end of 2009, Ms. Simmons was under fire for having sat on Goldman’s compensation committee; how could she have let those enormous bonus payouts pass unremarked? By February the next year Ms. Simmons had left the board. The position was just taking up too much time, she said.

    Outside directors are supposed to serve as helpful, yet less biased, advisers on a firm’s board. Having made their wealth and their reputations elsewhere, they presumably have enough independence to disagree with the chief executive’s proposals. If the sky, and the share price is falling, outside directors should be able to give advice based on having weathered their own crises.

    The researchers from Ohio University used a database that covered more than 10,000 firms and more than 64,000 different directors between 1989 and 2004. Then they simply checked which directors stayed from one proxy statement to the next. The most likely reason for departing a board was age, so the researchers concentrated on those “surprise” disappearances by directors under the age of 70. They found that after a surprise departure, the probability that the company will subsequently have to restate earnings increases by nearly 20%. The likelihood of being named in a federal class-action lawsuit also increases, and the stock is likely to perform worse. The effect tended to be larger for larger firms. Although a correlation between them leaving and subsequent bad performance at the firm is suggestive, it does not mean that such directors are always jumping off a sinking ship. Often they “trade up,” leaving riskier, smaller firms for larger and more stable firms.

    But the researchers believe that outside directors have an easier time of avoiding a blow to their reputations if they leave a firm before bad news breaks, even if a review of history shows they were on the board at the time any wrongdoing occurred. Firms who want to keep their outside directors through tough times may have to create incentives. Otherwise outside directors will follow the example of Ms. Simmons, once again very popular on campus.

答案精析：根据题干可定位至最后一段。最后一段指出，即使以往记录显示，在外部董事仍旧在任期间有失误发生，只要在坏消息爆出之前离开，就可以更容易地避免名誉受损。想在困难时期留住外部董事的公司则需要create incentive（创建奖励机制）。言下之意，外部董事可能会因为奖励而留下来，故A选项为正确答案。

错项排除：原文只是提到，失误发生时外部董事在公司任职，但并未说明是外部董事产生失误，故B选项错误。C选项在原文中并未提及，属于无中生有，故错误。D选项与原文文意相反，故错误。

长难句分析：But the researchers believe that outside directors have an easier time of avoiding a blow to their reputations if they leave a firm before bad news breaks, even if a review of history shows they were on the board at the time any wrongdoing occurred.

本句主干为the researchers believe that …，为主谓宾结构，宾语为that引导的宾语从句。在宾语从句中嵌套了if引导的条件状语从句和even if引导的让步状语从句，而if引导的条件状语从句中嵌套了before引导的时间状语从句；even if引导的让步状语从句中嵌套了省略that的宾语从句they were on the board充当shows的宾语，该宾语从句中嵌套了省略引导词的定语从句any wrongdoing occurred充当time的后置定语。

句意为：但是研究者认为，即使以往记录显示，失误发生在外部董事仍在董事会任职期间，只要外部董事在坏消息爆出之前离开，就可以更容易地避免名誉受损。